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Larry Chapman: Our objective today is to discuss the tax expenditure review 
that is currently being performed by the federal government. The review has not 
garnered much attention, unless one reads the fine print in the 2016 budget1 or 
is a close follower of the Department of Finance’s press releases. We are going 
to tell you why we think the review is significant. Kenneth McKenzie will dis-
cuss the theory and the measurement of tax expenditures and the benchmark 
that should be used.2 Whether something is or is not a tax expenditure depends 
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somewhat on the base you are measuring it against. When we finish that discus-
sion, we will dive into the tax expenditure reports. The Department of Finance 
publishes these reports every few years. The most recent one is dated 2016.3 We 
are going to examine some numbers from the most recent report and talk about 
significant ways in which the government provides incentives and tax relief 
through the Income Tax Act4 and whether these items are or are not tax expendi-
tures. At the end of the session, we are going to predict—or, maybe more correctly, 
speculate on—what the government might do as a result of this review.
The 2016 budget contains a few code words that help to set the context for 
the tax expenditure review—words like “fair, efficient, [and] fiscally responsible.”5 
We all agree that these attributes are good things. The budget announcement 
also says that the objective of the review is to determine whether the tax system 
works well for Canadians, with a view to eliminating poorly targeted or ineffi-
cient tax measures. The panel members’ first message is that we believe that a 
tax expenditure review is quite different from a review of the tax system. A 
review of the tax system is and should be a much more comprehensive exercise 
than examining a number of tax expenditures and deciding whether they are fair, 
efficient, and appropriately targeted.
Lindsay Tedds reminded me that this review is part of the Liberals’ election 
platform. The platform said that tax expenditures would be reviewed with an 
objective of finding $3 billion of expenditures that were ineffective or poorly 
targeted and thereby obtaining $3 billion of savings over the four-year mandate.6
In a June 17, 2016 press release, Finance announced the appointment of a 
panel of external experts to advise it on the tax expenditure review.7 The mem-
bers of the expert panel are Robin Boadway (Queen’s University); Kim Brooks 
(Dalhousie University Law School); Kevin Dancey (retired—formerly the 
president of CPA Canada and senior partner of PwC); Luc Godbout (Université 
de Sherbrooke); Jinyan Li (Osgoode Hall Law School); Kevin Milligan (Uni-
versity of British Columbia); and Jennifer Robson (Carleton University).
 The members of the panel were obviously selected for their knowledge of 
the Canadian tax system, but also with a view to avoiding the appearance of 
conflicts of interest; thus, most of them are academics. Not surprisingly, a num-
ber of them have done research and published papers on various fiscal policy 
matters, so they come to the review with opinions on the tax system.
The next event of significance is the November 1, 2016 economic statement,8 
which reported that the government expected to incur deficits as follows:
•฀ 2016-17,฀−$25.1 billion;
•฀ 2017-18,฀−$27.8 billion;
•฀ 2018-19,฀−$25.9 billion;
•฀ 2019-18,฀−$19.3 billion.
Another election promise was to incur relatively small budget deficits and 
return to balanced budgets before the end of the Liberals’ first mandate.9
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Looking at the economic statement and the relatively large deficits that we 
are facing, the panel members feel that it is reasonable to question whether or 
not this tax expenditure review is solely a review of the fairness, efficiency, and 
effectiveness of expenditures, or whether it might be described with some other 
code words —such as “finding a way to raise some money to pay for the deficit.” 
If the government’s real objective is to address a structural deficit, we are far 
beyond tinkering; the government should be undertaking a much more compre-
hensive review.
The 2016 tax expenditure report provides estimates for tax expenditures for 
2010-13 and projections for 2014-17. The use of the term “estimate” reflects 
the imprecision inherent in determining the cost of tax expenditures; “projec-
tions” reflects the fact that without the benefit of tax data, the results of looking 
into the future are even more imprecise.10 When one reads the report, it is im-
mediately apparent that there are some sacred cows (one might also call them 
changes) whose disappearance would be politically toxic.
Some of the larger tax expenditures are the following:
•฀ RPPs and RRSPs, $35-42 billion;
•฀ charitable฀donations,฀$2.6฀billion;
•฀ age฀credit,฀$3฀billion฀(and฀growing);
•฀ non-taxation฀of฀gambling฀and฀lottery฀winnings฀(not฀estimated฀by฀Finance);฀
and
•฀ non-taxation฀of฀private฀health฀and฀dental฀plans,฀$2.8฀billion.
 It is hard to imagine a government proposing changes to some of these fea-
tures of the income tax, even though their cost is very large, because they are 
so entrenched and taxpayers have come to expect them. One of the themes that 
runs through the tax expenditure report is the amount of support given to senior 
citizens. The non-taxation of gambling winnings is an interesting item, and 
contrasts with the tax treatment in the United States. Possibly one of the more 
politically sensitive items is the non-taxation of the cost of providing private 
health and dental benefit plans because of the impact on a large part of the popu-
lation and the social policy implications of appearing to tax expenditures that 
promote health and welfare. Moreover, this tax policy benefits a large segment 
of the middle class, a Liberal election priority.
On the possibly less toxic list, and thus on the list of tax expenditures that 
are more likely to get close examination, might be the following:
 1) the preferential treatment of capital gains:
 a) 50 percent inclusion rate; personal income tax, $4-6 billion; corporate 
income tax, $4-7 billion;
 b) lifetime exemption, $1 billion;
 c) principal residence exemption, $4-5 billion;
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 d) employee stock option deduction (equivalent to capital gains treatment), 
$600-$800 million;
 2) the small business deduction, $3-$4 billion; and
 3) scientific research and experimental development (SR & ED), $3 billion 
(refundable and non-refundable credits).
Finally, some expenditures are purely targeted tax cuts that in the view of 
some economists have very little economic justification. These include the 
following:
•฀ boutique฀ credits฀ (such฀ as฀ transit฀ and฀ volunteer฀ firefighting),฀ at฀ least฀
$500 million and possibly more than $1 billion;
•฀ employment฀tax฀credit,฀$2฀billion;
•฀ pension฀income฀splitting,฀$1฀billion฀(and฀growing);฀and
•฀ pension฀income฀credits,฀$1฀billion฀(and฀growing).
Many observers have speculated that there might be changes to the preferen-
tial treatment of capital gains. Apparently there was even a flurry of activity 
before the November 1, 2016 economic statement, when taxpayers took action 
to realize capital gains just in case the economic statement announced a change 
to the capital gains inclusion rate. It is clear that the capital gains inclusion rate 
is a big number—$4 billion to $6 billion—and that is just the personal tax rev-
enue impact; there is another $4 billion to $7 billion of corporate tax revenue 
impact. The lifetime capital gains exemption is $1 billion, and the principal 
residence exemption is $4 to $5 billion. Employee stock options represent a 
smaller number, but this is a topic that we are going to talk about because we 
think it is significant from a tax fairness perspective. The small business deduction 
is $3 billion to $4 billion; SR & ED is another big number. Finally, the so-called 
boutique credits have been roundly criticized from the time that they were first 
introduced, and yet they just seem to multiply.11 It was thought that the Liberals 
were going to do something about them, but in their first budget they introduced 
the teachers’ tax credit. Collectively, these credits costs between $500 million 
and $1 billion in lost tax revenue. By eliminating the credits, the Liberals could 
fulfill their election promises to find $3 billion over four years. Unfortunately, 
we doubt that is going to happen as a result of the review.
In the context of this background, Kenneth McKenzie is going to talk about 
tax expenditure theory; Lindsay Tedds and Shawn Porter are going to talk about 
capital gains and items that receive the equivalent treatment; and I am going to 
discuss the small business deduction. We will wrap up with some thoughts on 
how the expenditure review will conclude and what the government should be 
doing more broadly with the tax system.
Kenneth McKenzie: My purpose today is to highlight some conceptual and 
theoretical issues that are important to keep in mind when one is thinking about 
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tax expenditures. In this regard, I will start with the most basic question: What 
are tax expenditures? Tax expenditures are in some ways in the eye of the 
 beholder, and there are many conceptual issues that need to be confronted in 
order to measure them. I will touch on a few of the more important ones here.
The key issue is the benchmark system—what are you comparing the current 
tax system to? If one is to estimate how big a particular tax expenditure is, the 
answer is absolutely vital. I will return to this question later, but first I want to 
talk about two different approaches to thinking about tax expenditures, regard-
less of what the benchmark system is. One approach is to treat any deviation 
from the benchmark system, whatever that benchmark system may be, as a tax 
expenditure. This approach reflects a very broad view of tax expenditures. An-
other, narrower, view is that only a deviation from the benchmark system that 
could conceivably be offered through the expenditure or the spending side of 
the fisc is a tax expenditure. This narrow view is consistent with the somewhat 
oxymoronic label “tax expenditure”; it fits with the idea that these are really 
expenditures that are being delivered through the tax system because it makes 
more administrative sense to do so. For example, consider two countries, A and B. 
Country A imposes a low 15 percent on tax on incomes that are less than 
$30,000. Country B doesn’t use the rate structure to deliver tax relief to low-
income taxpayers but rather employs credits that are targeted at taxpayers who 
earn $30,000 or less. Assume that the tax burden imposed on individuals who earn 
less than $30,000 income is exactly the same in the two countries; they have 
achieved the same outcome using different approaches. The standard approach, 
which is followed by the Department of Finance, is to treat the rate structure, but 
not tax credits, as part of the benchmark system. Under this approach, country B 
reports tax expenditures but country A does not. The economic outcome is the 
same in both cases, but it is achieved in different ways. The point of this example 
is to emphasize that there is some degree of arbitrariness in the measurement of 
tax expenditures. For example, the basic personal amount is reported as a tax 
expenditure of $36 billion, but it could equivalently be delivered through the 
rate structure, in which case it wouldn’t be called a tax expenditure at all.
My own view is that “tax expenditures” are a subset of “tax concessions,” 
and that not all tax reductions should be viewed as tax expenditures. This view 
suggests a three-step approach. First, identify the benchmark system (I will 
return to this point below). Second, determine the tax concessions relative to 
that benchmark. Third, determine whether the tax concession could be delivered 
on the spending side. If the answer is yes, it is a tax expenditure; if the answer 
is no, then it is not. Does the Department of Finance follow this approach in its tax 
expenditure accounts? In my view, the answer is sometimes yes and sometimes 
no; the devil is in the details. When I look at the tax expenditure accounts, my 
overall impression is that for the most part Finance takes steps 1 and 2—defining 
a benchmark system and the deviations from it—but doesn’t really take step 3, 
which involves asking, “Is this an expenditure that is just hidden as a tax credit, 
or is it a tax expenditure?” This approach results in an overly broad view, one 
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that treats things like the basic personal amount as a tax expenditure, for 
 example, and (unfortunately, in my view) gives rise to the notion of sacred 
cows—things that we simply will not touch—which drastically reduces the value 
of the tax expenditure exercise.
There are many other issues; I will touch on just a few here. Interestingly, 
the most common entry in the tax expenditure account is “not available,” which 
means that no data are available to support a meaningful estimate or projection. 
This reflects the fact that some things are very difficult to estimate in the context 
of tax expenditures. Most of these relate to the timing of when taxes are collected 
or deductions made. For example, tax expenditures are not typically reported for 
things like accelerated tax depreciation deductions, yet these can generate sig-
nificant “subsidies” for particular activities. Identifying them as tax expenditures 
with no associated dollar amount misrepresents their impact and purpose.
Another issue relates to the adding together of tax expenditures as a way to 
estimate the revenue implications of eliminating them. This is commonly done, 
but it is not appropriate for two reasons. First, such calculations do not take 
account of interactions between the various features of the tax system, of which 
there are many. It is therefore absolutely inappropriate to add them together. 
Indeed, the Department of Finance states this explicitly in the accounts, but it 
is often done in any event. Second, tax expenditure estimates do not take account 
of any behavioural responses to tax changes; they assume that there are none. 
These behavioural responses can significantly affect revenues. Therefore, tax 
expenditure accounts should be used very cautiously from the perspective of 
estimating the revenue implications of eliminating them.
I will now turn to the benchmark tax system. This is an extremely important 
issue because tax expenditures are computed as deviations with respect to a 
benchmark. There are two basic benchmarks that might be considered: compre-
hensive income and comprehensive consumption. It is fair to say that the 
 Department of Finance tax expenditure accounts lean heavily toward some notion 
of comprehensive income as a benchmark. The problem is that it is not at all 
clear that this is the appropriate benchmark.
To illustrate, take as a starting point the Carter commission.12 The lens 
through which the Carter report viewed the tax system was comprehensive 
income—“a buck is a buck is a buck.”
We know that many of the Carter commission’s recommendations were not 
actually implemented, but I think it is fair to say, perhaps arguably, that the no-
tion of comprehensive income guided tax policy discussions at the time. Since 
then, however, our tax system has evolved in a piecemeal fashion into a system 
that is very far removed from the Carter commission’s view of comprehensive 
income. And that evolution, again perhaps arguably, has been informed by 
insights into the benefits of consumption as opposed to income taxation. As it 
stands now, we actually have a hybrid income/consumption tax system, which 
leans much closer to being a comprehensive consumption tax than a compre-
hensive income tax, at least on the personal tax front. The treatment of registered 
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retirement savings plans (RRSPs), registered pension plans (RPPs), tax-free 
savings accounts (TFSAs), principal residences, etc. are all consistent with con-
sumption taxation, not income taxation. This, then, suggests that a more ap-
propriate benchmark to use in the computation of personal tax expenditures may 
well be a comprehensive consumption tax.
Under this approach, items are labelled “tax expenditures” in the Department 
of Finance accounts that are benchmarked (roughly) against a comprehensive 
income tax would not be tax expenditures benchmarked against a comprehensive 
consumption tax. For example:
•฀ RPPs, $27.5 billion;
•฀ RRSPs, $16.3 billion;
•฀ TFSAs, $855 million; and
•฀ non-taxation฀of฀gains฀on฀the฀principal฀residence,฀$5฀billion.
The principal residence exemption is interesting. It can be thought of as a big 
TFSA with no cap on it, invested in one particular asset—your home. The home 
is purchased with after-tax dollars, there is no deduction when you buy it, the 
income accrues tax-free, and the home is not taxable when you sell it. This is 
precisely how a TFSA works. This is perfectly consistent with consumption 
taxation, and would not be viewed as a tax expenditure under that benchmark, 
but it is identified as a substantial tax expenditure in the tax expenditure accounts 
as they stand now. Interestingly, many of these items (RPPs, RRSPs, TFSAs, and 
the principal residence exemption) are viewed as untouchable sacred cows, 
which I think reflects at least in part the understanding that comprehensive in-
come is not the appropriate benchmark.
In light of all of this, are tax expenditure estimates useful? On balance, I 
would say a qualified yes; but they need to be interpreted very carefully. Further 
in this connection, can a systematic review of tax expenditures yield positive 
results? Again I would say a qualified yes, in part because I have confidence in 
the people involved in the exercise and their understanding of these issues. There 
is some benefit in incrementally cherry-picking tax expenditures like boutique 
tax credits, and possibly some others. But at the end of the day, I think that 
viewing tax reform through a tax expenditure lens is fundamentally wrong and 
that we need to take a much more comprehensive approach to tax reform. It is 
time for another Carter commission.
Larry Chapman: From some of the comments that we are about to make, it is 
clear that there are so many interactions between the various tax expenditures 
and the tax system more broadly that looking at them in silos makes no sense.
Shawn Porter: I’m generally in agreement with what Ken had to say. I am just 
a practitioner, so I tend not to look at these things through a theoretical lens. 
One distinguishing comment that I would make about the tax expenditure review 
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process is that I am not quite as bearish on the prospects that something useful 
will or could come out of it. I think it can be useful to look at parts of the system 
as long as you are mindful of the broader context in which the parts you are 
looking at fit. It’s a much more ambitious job to try to reform the whole system 
all at once, so I am not quite as skeptical about the review. What I would like 
to see—and this is a common refrain from those of us outside government—is 
a little more sunlight on the process. It would be better if the analysis and advice 
of the tax expenditure review panel was produced and made available for the 
public to see. My own sense is that a lot of these tax expenditures border much 
more closely on political decision making than on evidence-based policy analysis. 
But whatever the rationale, interested stakeholders and the public would benefit 
from an opportunity to review the report. We get the government we elect, and 
I don’t begrudge them their right to make political choices; but I think the 
system, and ultimately the quality of the choices, would benefit from a bit more 
sunlight.
Now I will turn to a discussion of the inclusion rate for capital gains. The 
timing benefit for capital gains—which are taxed only upon realization—and 
the capital gains exemption are also significant aspects of (and benefits under) 
the Canadian tax system, but we are going to focus on the inclusion rate. As 
Larry mentioned, the less than full inclusion rate for capital gains is a large tax 
expenditure, both at the corporate level and at the personal level, so presumably 
it is going to get some attention in the context of this review.
As Ken mentioned, these tax expenditure estimates do not take into account 
behavioural responses. I think that we would all agree intuitively, and there is 
ample economic evidence on this point, that if you increased the inclusion rate 
to 100 percent it would not yield additional tax revenue equal to the amount of 
the tax expenditure. You would obviously get significant behavioural reaction 
to a complete elimination of the tax expenditure. On the other hand, a modest 
increase in the inclusion rate would likely produce some meaningful amounts 
of incremental government revenue over time, particularly taking into account 
the fact that individuals are deemed to dispose of property at fair market value 
on death in Canada. That said, this is a great example that illustrates Ken’s point 
about the interdependence of tax expenditures. For example, individuals may 
defer dispositions (or realizations) during their lifetimes, increase donations of 
publicly listed securities to take advantage of tax expenditures in that context, 
or increase charitable giving on death, all of which would reduce the revenue 
yield from an increase in the capital gains inclusion rate. And I haven’t even 
touched on the impact of reduced incentive effects on government revenue. If 
revenue raising is the goal, then increasing the inclusion rate, in and of itself, 
has its limitations.
The following is the typical list of justifications for less than full inclusion 
of capital gains in income:
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•฀ incentive฀for฀ the฀risk฀taking,฀saving,฀and฀investing฀that฀foster฀economic฀
growth;
•฀ relief฀for฀taxation฀of฀inflationary฀gains;
•฀ relief฀for฀higher฀tax฀rates฀due฀to฀bunching฀of฀income;฀and
•฀ partial฀relief฀for฀double฀taxation฀of฀corporate฀profits.
These justifications are commented on extensively in the academic literature, 
Finance publications, and government budget documents whenever any tinkering 
occurs with respect to the taxation of capital gains and related rules. My main 
observation is that this is a somewhat disparate list, although commentators 
often refer to all of these rationalizations and justifications together as support 
for the argument that less than a full inclusion rate is appropriate for capital 
gains. There is no real quantitative, structural linkage between the capital gains 
inclusion rate and the items on the list, which gives rise to the question: which 
one of these justifications is the most compelling, or, asked differently, at which 
one of these justifications is the less than full inclusion rate really targeted?
I do not suggest that the middle two items are unimportant, but I think that 
the first and last bullet points are really the drivers. I will return to these points, 
but I want to touch briefly on the middle two first.
With respect to the taxation of inflationary gains, it is true that it is inherently 
unfair and inequitable to tax inflationary gains, but that’s what the tax system 
does. Generally speaking, we tax nominal income or nominal GDP. Not all 
employment income growth is real, but it is taxed nonetheless. Capital gains are 
not singled out for special treatment in that context. The inflationary element of 
a capital gain is more apparent when properties are held over a long period, but 
it doesn’t change the fact that the tax system is generally based on the notion 
that we tax nominal income. And the fact that we defer the taxation of capital 
gains until the realization event is a very significant benefit, particularly for 
assets that produce real returns held over a long period. I take no issue with the 
deferral benefit for all the practical and liquidity reasons that have traditionally 
been given, but it’s important not to lose sight of it in the balance of the 
analysis.
As for the bunching of income, I’m not sure that’s as big a problem as it is 
often made out to be. There is obviously no bunching issue for capital gains at 
the corporate level. The corporate rate structure is flat. As for the personal tax 
rate structure, one hits the top rate relatively quickly, and most of the gains are 
concentrated among individuals in those upper income groups. It is true that 
there will be cases where individual taxpayers will realize a significant capital 
gain once in their lives (or perhaps a few times, but infrequently over their lives), 
and they will pay considerably more tax than they would have paid if that 
income was averaged over the holding period. But if the less than full inclusion 
rate is intended to compensate for the bunching effect, it is a crude approach. 
And other sources of income (for example, employment income) can also spike 
at different times in a person’s life. We’ve had averaging in our tax system before. 
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I take no issue with the fairness aspects of averaging, but the complexity is sig-
nificant, especially in the context of capital gains. Coupling the deferral of 
capital gains taxation with averaging would be particularly generous. It’s inter-
esting to note that deferral contributes to the lock-in effect, which in turn (or 
eventually) exacerbates the bunching-of-income problem.13 From this viewpoint, 
expecting a less than full inclusion rate to address, or compensate for, such 
interdependent (and, in the case of deferral, self-inflicted) problems seems a bit 
ambitious.
That brings me to corporate rates and the role that a less than full inclusion 
rate plays in providing some relief from double taxation as it relates to corporate 
profits. The main message here is that we’ve had significant reductions in corporate 
tax rates over the last 15 years with no change to the capital gains inclusion rate, 
and the rates are out of alignment here. This misalignment manifests itself now 
in a very wide gap between dividend tax rates imposed on individuals and capital 
gains rates. Even if we do not take into account GRIP and LRIP (the general-rate 
and low-rate income pools) and those sorts of distinctions, that gap is quite wide. 
If the inclusion rate was increased today to two-thirds, $100 of income earned 
by a corporation would, in rough terms, bear $25 of corporate-level tax, and 
two-thirds of the $75 residual taxed personally at 50 percent would result in $25 
of individual-level tax for a roughly 50 percent tax burden. The calculation is 
not perfect, in part because the provinces have not followed the federal example 
in truing up the dividend tax credit rate as a result of recent rate changes, so 
there will still be a gap, but that might go a long way toward taking the fun out 
of a lot of the corporate surplus-stripping transactions that the tax community 
engages in today.
A few words on economic effects: I am probably the least qualified person 
up here to comment on this topic, but I will give you some perspective as a 
practitioner. A key observation about the 50 percent inclusion rate is that it ap-
plies across the board, which is one of the reasons that this tax expenditure is 
so large. There is no holding-period requirement. The same inclusion rate applies 
whether the gain is earned in corporate solution or at the individual level. Perhaps 
of most interest, it is not conditioned on whether the property is a corporate 
share or any other capital property, even though, as I mentioned previously, one 
of the more compelling rationales for the less than full inclusion rate is the role 
that it plays in relieving double taxation on corporate profits and helping to 
facilitate neutral tax burdens in relation to dividends. Many capital gains emanate 
from property other than corporate shares (for example, real estate, passive invest-
ments, and personal-use property), and the 50 percent inclusion rate is equally 
available for those.
It seems reasonably apparent that the goal of the less than full inclusion rate 
is to encourage risk taking in Canada and innovation-producing and productivity-
enhancing activities with a view to improving Canada’s economic performance 
and our standard of living. The challenge lies in how to define a target (the object 
of the preference) that produces the desired outcomes.
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Legislators would have to deal with a few key design questions if we were to 
aim the preferential inclusion rate at a narrower category of properties. Targeting 
capital income incentives is not particularly new in Canada. Canada has a rich 
history of tinkering with the capital gains deduction, not to mention various 
other incentive regimes for investing and risk taking. Interestingly, we have not 
tinkered much with targeting the capital gains inclusion rate. For the first 17 
years after the introduction of capital gains taxation in the 1971 tax reform, we 
had a 50 percent inclusion rate. Generally speaking, we went to 662⁄ 3 percent in 
1988, to 75 percent in 1990, and (in two steps) back to 50 percent in 2000. That’s 
quite a bit of stability in terms of the inclusion rate over a 45-year period. Canada 
has targeted and experimented with the capital gains exemption, but the inclusion 
rate has been remarkably stable. I think that’s probably wise because of the 
difficulty in targeting activities, expenditures, and behaviours effectively through 
legislative language. Each time you try to target, you are going to open up a 
cottage industry whereby the planners will seek to convert (or divert) income 
into the targeted box. Although not targeting the inclusion rate seems wise, it 
does give me pause because the across-the-board preferential inclusion rate 
makes the tax expenditure relatively expensive, and at least parts of it are likely 
ineffective in achieving its goals.
I should also point out the asymmetrical treatment of capital losses. If we are 
talking about wanting to encourage expenditures and risk taking, we continue 
to have a long tradition in Canada of less than generous asymmetrical treatment 
of losses. Although to do otherwise would be expensive, the government shares 
more equally in realized capital gains than it does in realized losses, as a result 
of requiring losses to be deducted only against realized gains.
I have a few concluding comments on the capital gains inclusion rate prefer-
ence. One point runs to the desired mix of income and consumption taxes. (Ken 
touched on this when he inquired about the appropriate benchmark against which 
to measure tax expenditures.) There is a tension and an evolution in the Canadian 
tax system in terms of striking the right balance between taxing income and 
taxing consumption. Conventional wisdom suggests lower tax burdens on in-
come (especially capital income), militating against any increase of the inclusion 
rate for the taxation of capital gains. A competing viewpoint—for those who 
believe that capital income taxation preferences generally are contributing to, 
if not driving and widening, the income inequality problem—is that the inclusion 
rate should be increased to enhance overall progressivity and redistribute the 
incremental revenue through the tax system. There are of course many combin-
ations of options available to deal with these competing notions.
Putting all of this together, I am open to a modest increase in the inclusion 
rate in the environment today. I am influenced most by the difference between 
rates on dividends and capital gains—perhaps because I am an accountant and 
that’s something tangible that I can get my mind wrapped around—and the belief 
that we should narrow the gap from the perspective of integration policy and 
curtail surplus-stripping activities. But I would condition that modest capital 
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gains inclusion rate increase on a reduction in the top rate on the individual side, 
or at least significantly increasing the threshold at which the top rates begin to 
apply to, say, $400,000 or more.
The last thing that I would say to the government is that if consideration is 
being given to increasing the inclusion rate, it would be appropriate to provide 
a transitional rule in one form or another, and I think it would be a good idea to 
signal that there would be a transitional rule any day now. There is a paranoia 
in the taxpayer and adviser communities that an inclusion rate increase will be 
effective immediately upon announcement, resulting in a lot of wasted effort 
with taxpayers undertaking crystallization or step-up transactions before every 
budget (and economic statement). Although there is no precedent for tightening 
changes to the inclusion rate having been made with immediate effect, this 
paranoia is traceable in large part to the 2010 budget’s tightening of the stock 
option deduction: that measure took effect for option exercises immediately after 
the announcement. I prefer what Finance Minister Bill Morneau did last Decem-
ber in connection with the stock option deduction debate. Comments had been 
made by the Liberals in their 2015 election platform, and people were concerned 
that there could be tightening on that front. The government responded in 
 December 2015 (well in advance of the 2016 federal budget) that if there were 
to be changes in that context, such changes would be prospective. I think that 
is the preferred approach—not only to avoid the deadweight transactional costs, 
but also to avoid what I suspect would be a regressive outcome, reflecting the 
practical reality that high net worth individuals primarily would undertake the 
protective planning.
Lindsay Tedds: Ken has spoken about the need to use a clearly defined bench-
mark tax system to appropriately identify tax expenditures. Shawn has set out 
detailed considerations related to the capital gains inclusion rate. These two 
aspects come together nicely as part of an analysis of the employee stock option 
deduction. I am sure that we all know by now that there is nothing mystical or 
magical about stock options. They are simply a form of deferred compensation, 
one of many tools that that are used to compensate employees. Because stock 
options are deferred compensation, the benefit derived from the stock option 
award is considered to be employment income.
How, then, is the income benefit from stock options taxed? The tax treatment 
of stock options originally evolved out of case law because the taxation of stock 
options was not included in the original Act. The tax treatment was eventually 
incorporated into the Act in the 1970s. In contrast to other forms of employment 
income, there is no immediate income benefit when stock options are granted 
or when they vest, and therefore no tax liability accrues at either point.14 Rather, 
an income benefit arises when the stock options are exercised. At the time of 
exercise, the benefit that must be included in employment income for tax pur-
poses is the difference between the fair market value of the stock on the date 
that the options are exercised and the price at which the options were granted 
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(the strike price). If the exercised options—the shares in the stock—are held for 
a time and sold sometime after the exercise date, then the difference between 
the proceeds of the disposition of the stock and the fair market value of the stock 
on the date that the option is exercise is taxed as a capital gain or a capital loss, 
as the case may be.15 This is the benchmark tax treatment of stock options; the 
income benefit is taxed at exercise, and everything else that accrues after that 
point is a capital gain or loss, because the employee is now holding a risky asset. 
To link this point back to Ken’s comments, this benchmark tax treatment holds 
regardless of whether the tax system is based on income or on consumption (in 
this case, defined as income less savings).
There are, however, two important deviations from the benchmark system in 
Canada, meaning that the income benefit from employee stock options is treated 
differently from any other form of immediate or deferred employment compen-
sation. First, under the benchmark system, issuers of employment income should 
be permitted to deduct the employment income from their own taxable income, 
ensuring that double taxation of the income does not take place. With respect 
to employee stock options, in Canada no deduction is (or ever has been) permitted 
to the issuer of the stock options. Second, the employee is permitted to deduct 
a portion of the income benefit, set at the capital gains rate, which is currently 
50 percent.16 That is, as the capital gain rate varies so does the employee stock 
option deduction. An important caveat that is often overlooked, however, is that 
the employee stock option deduction is allowed only if certain conditions are 
met: (1) the shares to be acquired are common shares; (2) the employee is at 
arm’s length with the issuer; and (3) at the time the options are granted they are 
not in the money. It is not clear to what extent these conditions are scrutinized 
by the Canada Revenue Agency (CRA) when a tax filer claims the employee 
stock option deduction. There is certainly room to be concerned about compliance 
with these conditions, given the evidence regarding the manipulation of the grant 
dates of stock options in the 1990s and 2000s. And while it appears that fraudu-
lent dating practices have been curtailed in recent years, evidence both in Canada 
and the United States suggests that this is still an ongoing issue of concern.17
With respect to who claims the employee stock option deduction, table 1 
summarizes information compiled from the tax-filer statistics available from the 
CRA’s website.18 In total, just over 48,000 tax filers (0.18 percent) claimed the 
stock option deduction in 2013, deducting a total amount of nearly $2.3 million. 
Most of this amount (98 percent) was deducted by individuals who reported 
more than $100,000 in income; of that amount, 90 percent was deducted by 
individuals who reported more than $250,000 in income in the tax year. Finance 
estimates that the cost to government in lost revenue was $630 million in 2013; 
that amount grew to about $840 million in 2015. This is not an insignificant 
amount, and it does not include amounts lost by the provincial treasuries. How-
ever, this revenue is only potentially lost, which is a point we will return to 
because it is not as simple as it seems.
[catch table 1 near here]
4:14 CHAPMAN, MCKENZIE, PORTER, AND TEDDS
What were the policy reasons for supporting the creation of the employee 
stock option deduction? The deduction was originally available only to Canadian-
controlled private corporations (CCPCs) in 1977. The rationale was that the 
deduction would allow a small business to attract and retain employees without 
impairing its working capital. In particular, it was a way for CCPCs to compete 
for talent with larger public companies. The employee stock option deduction 
was extended to all corporations in 1984; it was billed as a way to encourage 
more widespread use of employee stock option plans, with the idea that doing 
so would increase productivity. More recently, it has been argued, mostly by the 
tech industry, that the employee stock option is required to curb the brain drain 
to the United States.
These policy arguments, however, are easily refuted. First, since the employee 
stock option deduction was extended to options issued by most companies in 
Canada, CCPCs no longer have a competitive advantage in using the employee 
stock option deduction to attract and retain talent. Further, the employee does 
not have to remain with the company to benefit from the deduction; when an 
employee leaves a company, stock options typically vest immediately and expire 
within a set time following the departure, but the departing employee can still 
exercise the options within the required period and claim the stock option deduc-
tion. Second, with regard to encouraging the use of employee stock option plans, 
we know that employee stock options are more widely used in the United States, 
which does not provide a deduction to the employee (at least for non-qualified 
stock options, which are at least 95 percent of the options available).19 Instead, 
in the United States, issuers of stock options are permitted a deduction. Third, 
there is no clear evidence that employee stock options have any discernible effect 
on employee productivity at the micro level.20 While firms that grant options 
broadly to employees tend to grow more rapidly, there is no conclusive evidence 
that this is the result of employees working harder and more innovatively. In 
addition, not only are stock option grants to non-executive employees too small 
to provide any incentives, but few of these lower-level employees have the neces-
sary authority to make the types of decisions and effect the changes necessary 
to greatly increase productivity. Fourth, there is little evidence to suggest that 
tax rates on income are primary drivers of the brain drain. There are many 
reasons why talented, educated individuals remain in or leave any given country. 
Certainly, opportunity is an important factor, but so too is the overall quality-
of-life bundle, which extends far beyond tax rates. Combined with these factors 
are obvious concerns associated with tax neutrality and fairness that arise because 
one form of compensation is being tax-preferred over all others.
If there is a need to provide tax preference for compensation, why provide it 
only for stock options? Why not for shares, deferred stock, or income compensa-
tion? Why are stock options treated so differently? And why is it that taxpayers 
rather than employers are the ones that need to ensure that employees are prop-
erly compensated? After all, any change in tax treatment to stock options can 
be easily offset by the employer simply issuing more options. There is, however, 
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one potentially plausible and defensible argument in favour of the tax preference 
of stock options: if those employees who receive the stock options are risk-
averse individuals, the options actually have a subjective value that is less than 
the market value. In that case, reducing the inclusion rate reflects the difference 
the individual’s valuation and the market valuation. However, many of the people 
who receive stock options are not risk-averse individuals, so the blanket deduc-
tion that currently exists is poorly targeted. In addition, to the extent that the 
stock option deduction promotes the increased use of stock options by employers, 
then the portfolio of risk-adverse individuals continues to lack the degree of 
asset diversification that would be congruent with their risk preference.
One last point to consider concerns insider disclosure rules related to stock 
options. Individuals who receive stock option awards, exercise stock options, 
and sell the shares from an exercised stock option are required to publicly 
disclose these events as a way to curb improper granting and trading practices. 
With respect to stock option grants, this includes concerns related to (1) “spring 
loading” or issuing grants immediately before the release of good news; (2) “bullet 
dodging,” or issuing grants immediately following the release of bad news; and 
(3) “backdating,” or the act of choosing a date for a stock option grant after the 
date has occurred but claiming to have granted the options at the earlier date in 
order to take advantage of the historical price performance of a company’s stock. 
The Canadian Securities Administrators/Autorités canadiennes en valeurs 
 mobilières have clearly noted that disclosure requirements for stock option 
grants limit these improper dating practices, and studying actual compliance 
with these requirements is important to understanding their deterrence efficacy. 
Recent evidence regarding compliance with the reporting rules for stock option 
grants in Canada is concerning, and provides further reasons to question their 
preferential tax treatment.21
When the evidence is considered in its totality, it suggests that Canada should 
return to the benchmark tax treatment of stock options. This treatment includes 
allowing the issuer to take the deduction and fully taxing the income benefit in 
the hands of the recipient, and doing so is consistent with either a consumption-
based or an income-based benchmark tax system. This proposition then circles 
back to the point made by Larry regarding whether or not doing so would lead 
to a resulting increase in tax revenues. That is, would doing so be considered a 
tax grab by Finance? The answer is easy: Absolutely not. The primary motiva-
tion for this tax change is purely one of tax fairness and tax neutrality, not one 
of accruing revenues. Mintz and Venkatachalam22 recently found that reverting 
to this benchmark treatment would raise virtually no revenue. However, this 
finding was based on an analysis of Canada’s top 100 corporations. If smaller 
companies are included, there may be some marginal revenue gains. However, 
changing the benchmark system would also likely result in behavioural changes 
as companies shift into other compensation devices, so it is not clear what the 
end effect would be. But again, the argument regarding the needed change to 
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the tax treatment of stock options is not about revenues; it is about the appropri-
ate taxation of compensation.
Larry Chapman: I’m going to deal briefly with the principal residence exemp-
tion. It’s another big number. You have to go back to the Carter commission to 
find the policy reasons supporting the tax-exempt treatment that we have now.23 
The main reasons cited by the commission were as follows:
•฀ Gains฀are฀primarily฀inflationary.
•฀ Practically฀speaking,฀it฀is฀difficult฀to฀calculate฀the฀gain.
•฀ Non-taxation฀would฀be฀broadly฀equitable.
•฀ There฀would฀have฀to฀be฀a฀complex฀set฀of฀rules฀to฀defer฀taxation฀for฀gains฀
that were reinvested after one sold a home and then purchased a replace-
ment home.
It is questionable whether principal residence gains are primarily inflationary 
in today’s environment. In some Canadian markets that might be true, but in 
others it is clearly not. Two of the other reasons (difficulty of calculation and 
simplicity) are still valid. The difficulty of calculating is probably applicable to 
almost everyone. Most people don’t keep detailed records of how much money 
they spend improving their homes. Finally, I think that there are good reasons 
for questioning whether the exemption is still broadly equitable and whether the 
continuation of a complete principal residence exemption is appropriate. Con-
sider someone who makes a $2 million gain on his or her home and someone 
who makes a $2 million gain from selling a qualified small business corporation. 
The tax system rewards the person for selling the house more than it does for 
building up $2 million of value in a company. The Carter commission also 
discussed the possibility of putting a cap on the amount of the principal resi-
dence exemption that could be claimed. An exemption with a cap may have some 
merit at this time to make the exemption more broadly equitable. As noted above, 
reinvestment rules would be required if gains were invested in a replacement 
principal residence. Selecting a principled basis for determining the amount of 
the cap would be a challenge. Could it be the same amount as the lifetime capital 
gains limit, or would one select an arbitrary amount (such as $1 million) that 
would be indexed? Would it be appropriate to have a minimum holding period 
before the exemption could be claimed? Would it be necessary to have transitional 
rules? All of these questions would require study, analysis, and consultation, but 
if fairness is the goal then this is a topic that is crying out for examination. 
With respect to the small business deduction, it is clear that this is also a big 
number—$3-4 billion. The first and probably the most significant policy reason 
offered to support the small business deduction is that it’s very difficult for small 
businesses to raise funds to expand. The small business deduction is justified as 
an effective way to deal with the market failure arising from the inability of 
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small businesses to get the financing they need to expand their businesses. The 
tax savings provide small businesses with an additional source of financing.
On the critical side, there are two reasons why the small business deduction 
might be questioned:
 1) Is it an effective way to deal with the market failure? Does it really do what 
it is supposed to do? (There are good reasons to raise that question.)
 2) Does it encourage small businesses to remain small? (There are very differ-
ing views on this issue. On one side you have Chen and Mintz, who sup-
ported this theory.24 Dachis and Lester reached a different conclusion.)25
Ted Mallett of the Canadian Federation of Independent Business has written 
in support of the small of the small business deduction.26 Given his affiliation, 
that is not too surprising. Wolfson et al. focused on the use of the small business 
deduction by highly paid professionals to achieve a significant tax deferral ad-
vantage.27 They were very critical of that use of the small business deduction.
Regarding the market failure justification, it is reasonable to question whether 
the lower tax rate provides small businesses with funds that are sufficient to 
expand (see table 2).
[catch table 2 near here]
The lefthand column in table 2 shows the amount of capital that is invested 
in a small business, and the next three columns show the return on capital that 
would be achieved if a business had a 10 percent return, a 5 percent return or a 
2.5 percent return on capital. The last three columns show the tax savings that 
arise from the small business deduction based on those returns. These calcula-
tions are based on Alberta corporate rates, which are a little lower than the 
Ontario rates. The Ontario differential between the regular corporate rate and 
the small business rate is only 11.5 percent, whereas the Alberta differential is 
13.5 percent. A 10 percent return on $1 million of invested capital gives rise to 
$100,000 of profit; the tax saving from the small business deduction is $13,500. 
If the owner wants to expand the business, he or she has an incremental $13,500 
to invest as a result of the tax savings from the small business deduction. If the 
owner decides to do a 10 percent expansion, which is a relatively modest expan-
sion, he or she will need to accumulate those savings up for seven years before 
having enough money to finance the expansion. Is a small business owner going 
to wait seven years to finance an expansion? The market will have changed, the 
expansion opportunities will likely be different, and more capital may be re-
quired. Successful entrepreneurs are not going to wait several years to save 
enough money to finance their expansion. They will find another way. It can 
certainly be argued that (as my mother used to say) that every little bit helps. I 
agree, but I don’t think that the small business deduction is really the answer to 
the financing issue that small businesses face.
With respect to the barrier-to-growth argument, the main reason for suggest-
ing that the small business deduction is a growth barrier is the high marginal 
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tax rate that can arise when the deduction is phased out as taxable capital em-
ployed in Canada rises above $10 million.28 During the phaseout, and depending 
on the profitability of capital expansion, very high marginal tax rates can arise.29 
The theory clearly suggests that this could be an issue. But empirical evidence, 
obtained from talking to small business owners and advisers, suggests that small 
business owners who think they can make more money rarely factor into their 
decision making the loss of the small business deduction.
In 2014, the Department of Finance published an analysis of the small busi-
ness deduction as part of its tax expenditure report (see figures 1 and 2).30 
Figure 2 is supportive of the proposition that the small business deduction is not 
a serious barrier to growth. The large number of companies that are nowhere 
near the $10 million taxable capital threshold suggests that other factors are 
much more relevant in constraining their growth. Even for the corporations that 
have taxable capital in excess of $10 million, there does not appear to be any 
noticeable spike just before the $10 million capital threshold is reached. In 
contrast, it is clear from the spike in figure 1 just before the annual business 
limit is reached that tax planning is occurring: the benefit of the small business 
deduction is obtained by bonusing out income in excess of the maximum amount 
qualifying for the deduction.
[catch figures 1 and 2 near here]
The other point to note is the number of businesses earning less than 
$100,000 that benefit from the small business deduction. The vast majority show 
income between $0 and $100,000. Those are small or very small businesses that, 
as noted previously, are not getting huge benefits from the small business deduc-
tion. There are probably better ways to help them out. Moreover, Dachis and 
Lester31 put forward a strong argument that the small business deduction is not 
a significant barrier to growth.
I may not agree with Jack Mintz that the small business deduction provides 
a barrier to growth, but I am in his camp, which favours its elimination and the 
development of more effective ways to deal with the financing market failure 
that clearly exists. The result should not be to give the government $3 billion 
more to spend on other programs or help to finance the spending deficits that it 
has created. If the small business deduction is to be eliminated, the government 
needs to think about how it could use the additional funds. For example, it might 
consider the following:
 1) Further reduce the general corporate rate. (A reduction could have a very 
positive impact on business investment, but it takes money away from the 
small business sector.)
 2) Give small businesses a better writeoff for capital assets or a simpler 
writeoff by not requiring them to capitalize their capital assets. This is 
another one of Jack Mintz’s suggestions that has simplification, economic, 
and cash flow benefits.)
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 3) Create a fund that small businesses can access to finance their expansions 
and deal directly with the market failure that the small business deduction 
is intended to address.
Our conclusion, in a few words, is that what is needed is a much broader 
review of the tax system than a tax expenditure review can accomplish.
Shawn Porter: What should the government do?
Kenneth McKenzie: As I indicated earlier, I would argue that we need to think 
about these issues from a much more comprehensive perspective. The Carter 
commission published its report 50 years ago, and our understanding of tax 
systems and their behavioural effects—in particular, in light of international 
tax-planning issues—has changed a lot since then. There is a great deal of insight 
generated by that research that can be brought to bear on the issue, and I don’t 
think a piecemeal tax expenditure review is necessarily the best way to go about 
it. I am realistic enough to admit, as per Shawn’s point, that perhaps, and some-
times, a piecemeal approach is better than nothing. But that is not true all of the 
time—and the danger is that we will end up with a bit of a dog’s breakfast of 
logical inconsistencies and contradictions using this approach. Indeed, I think 
a case can be made that this is precisely what we have after several decades of 
piecemeal changes. I really think that it is time to do a reset and look at tax 
reform in a more systematic and comprehensive way.
Lindsay Tedds: One of the things that bothers me is that myths percolate 
throughout the development of public policy, and we let those myths guide us. 
There are so many myths about the underlying issues with tax expenditures; but 
the world has changed and technology has changed, and we really have got to 
stop basing our tax policy on myths about what we believe to be true versus 
what is in fact true.
Larry Chapman: It’s been 50 years since the Carter commission’s report. I 
agree with Ken. It’s time to have a more comprehensive look at the whole tax 
system—in particular, the personal tax system, which has had less comprehen-
sive attention than the corporate tax system, which has undergone a number of 
reviews.
Questions from the Floor
Shawn Porter: One questioner has challenged the wisdom of even a modest 
increase to the capital gains inclusion rate generally on competitiveness grounds. 
I agree with the sentiment, and I may not have adequately acknowledged the 
competitiveness point in my formal remarks. Clearly, we do need to keep an eye 
on what goes on south of the border. I am mindful of that. The only thing I would 
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say to this questioner, though, is that Larry set the context earlier in terms of 
significant deficits as far as the eye can see. I think it is incumbent on the ques-
tioner to finance the forecasted level of government expenditures in some man-
ner. If you are not going to increase the inclusion rate, then maybe you increase 
consumption taxation on high-income consumers. But I think that something 
has to be done unless you believe, in good faith, that the financial position of 
the country, federally and provincially, is sound. Time doesn’t permit a broader 
philosophical discussion about the size of government and the operation of our 
federation, but I’m not inclined to think that Canada should be running deficits 
indefinitely in today’s economic environment. We’ve already seen how that 
movie ends.
Interestingly, another person has questioned whether a 75 percent inclusion 
rate for capital gains might result in a higher degree of convergence between 
the tax rates on dividends and capital gains. First, we need to introduce this 
person to the person who asked the previous question. Second, that may be true. 
I deliberately undershot in terms of trying to narrow that gap between capital 
gains and dividends in the spirit of moderation and in deference to the concern 
expressed by the first questioner. And there is another aspect to this question—in 
effect, the questioner wonders whether there is a way to structurally assimilate 
dividend taxation and capital gains taxation in the corporate context. That’s a 
good and valid question, but a very large one that is best left for another day.
Finally, there is a general question about complexity in the context of capital 
gains and dividend tax rates and corporate tax rates and the small business de-
duction. I would refer to something Larry said. If Larry did not actually say, 
“Repeal the small business deduction,” I think he came pretty close. And I think 
Kim Moody said almost the same thing in another session, because the complex-
ity has gone off the charts in terms of all of the legislative detail required to 
maintain the integrity of that rule. Perhaps simplification is grounds enough to 
justify the repeal of the small business deduction. But when you couple that 
with ambivalent economic evidence in favour of the incentive, I think it makes 
the answer fairly clear, ignoring politics. The repeal of the small business deduc-
tion would be a substantive simplification measure (ignoring transitional rules), 
obviating the need for GRIP and LRIP distinctions and relieving the associated 
corporation rules from a significant amount of pressure.
Larry Chapman: I agree that there’s a strong simplification argument for re-
pealing the small business deduction.
Kenneth McKenzie: I’ll paraphrase the next question: “When the cost of a tax 
expenditure is considered, should we consider the cost of administration and 
verification? Any tax preparer can tell you that the cost of the arts credit vastly 
exceeds the $75 credit.” This is an excellent point. As I indicated in my earlier 
remarks, one view is that, in principle, when thinking about a tax expenditure 
we should ask whether it is cheaper or more efficient from an administrative 
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and compliance point of view to deliver the benefit by way of the tax system 
rather the spending system. But as the questioner very correctly points out, this 
may not always be the case. Another example that most of you are probably 
familiar with is the SR & ED credit for research and development conducted by 
small businesses. My understanding is that there is a bit of a cottage industry, 
whereby tax preparers contact small businesses and offer to go back over past 
tax returns with a view to refiling to claim forgone R & D tax credits. This is 
clearly not the tax policy objective; the underlying R & D expenditures have 
already been made, and for whatever reason—lack of knowledge and the percep-
tion of high compliance costs are probably at the top of the list—the small 
businesses simply didn’t fill out the forms to receive the tax credit. This hypoth-
esis is consistent with my general view that we need to think about all of this, 
including administrative and compliance issues, in a more comprehensive way; 
just focusing on the tax expenditures as they are currently calculated can be very 
misleading.
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Table 1 Tax Filers Claiming the Employee Stock Option Deduction, 2013a
All filers
$100,000-
149,000
$150,000-
249,000 >$250,000
Number of filers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48,430 8,690 11,170 15,270
Percentage of filers. . . . . . . . . . . . 0.18 18 23 32
Amount deducted . . . . . . . . . . . . . $2,273,707 $48,684 $134,483 $2,054,779
Percentage deducted. . . . . . . . . . . 2 6 90
Source: Canada Revenue Agency, “Income Statistics 2015 (2013 Tax Year).”
Table 2 Tax Savings from the Small Business Deduction 
at Various Returns on Capital 
Return on capital Tax saving
Capital At 10.0% At 5.0% At 2.5% At 10.0% At 5.0% At 2.5%
$1,000,000 . . . . . . . . . . $  100,000 $ 50,000 $ 25,000 $ 13,500 $ 6,750 $ 3,375
$5,000,000 . . . . . . . . . . $  500,000 $250,000 $125,000 $ 67,500 $33,750 $16,875
$10,000,000 . . . . . . . . . $1,000,000 $500,000 $250,000 $135,000 $67,500 $33,750
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Figure 1 Number of Small CCPCs Claiming the Federal Small Business 
Deduction, by Taxable Income, 2000, 2001, and 2007
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Source: Canada, Department of Finance, Tax Expenditures and Evaluations 2013 (Ottawa:
Department of Finance, 2014).
Figure 2 Number of Small CCPCs Claiming the Federal Small Business 
Deduction, by Taxable Capital, 2000, 2001, and 2007
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